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1.1 Background of the Problem
Since its independence in 1961 the former Tanganyika also known as Tanzania mainland, and currently the United Republic of Tanzania, made various attempts to establish the requisite policy and legal frameworks for growth of its economy. In terms of foreign investments in Tanzania, it is argued that only in the first six years of independence​[1]​ and later during the post-1985 period, the country experienced a favourable attitude towards foreign investments. The government showed its determination when it enacted the Foreign Investment (Protection) Act, 1963, which aimed to provide a legal warranty for foreign investors so that they would be persuaded to invest in the country. The government also entered mutual arrangements with foreign governments to back-up, promote, and protect investments​[2]​.

The periods are separated by nearly two decades of hostility toward foreign private investments following the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration​[3]​.The heart of the social policy in Tanzania, which began by promulgating the Arusha Declaration in 1967, was to promote mass nationalisation. In this respect, to ensure that the objectives of the Arusha Declarations were met, various laws were enacted. The government guaranteed and compensated for the nationalised property, but with inside and outside forces, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the reign of the capitalist bloc, Tanzania failed to embrace the Arusha Declaration. In 1984, the fifth Constitutional amendment included the Bill of Rights, and in 1985 the ascendency of the second phase of presidency necessitated a changed investment climate. The enactment of the National Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act in April 1990 marked the climax of economic liberalisation, which started in November 1985. The Act covered the investment promotion centre, application procedure, areas of investment, investment incentives, investment protection, dispute settlement, and transfer of foreign currency. It also covers both foreign and local investors, but excludes investment in petroleum and minerals from the scope of the Act. The Act was silent on investors’ duties and provides procedures to avoid double taxation​[4]​.

The new investment regime saw the enactment of the Tanzania Investment Act, 1997, which must be read together with the Financial Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 1997. The Tanzania Investment Act, 1997 aimed to correct some aspects of the National Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act, 1990, which restricted potential investors from investing in Tanzania​[5]​. The Act offers a variety of incentives and legal guarantees. There are tax holidays, foreign exchange benefits and the right to use land. The process of foreign investors to invest in another country establishes a legal relationship between the host country and foreign investors, and the latter’s home state​[6]​. 

Therefore, in order to consolidate guarantees and instill confidence to foreign investors and enhance legal framework for arbitration of investment disputes, Tanzania joined the International Convention for Settlement of International Disputes with the nationals of other States [hereinafter referred to as ICSID​[7]​] and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency [hereinafter referred to as MIGA​[8]​].  Since 1980s there has been a tendency government to enter into bilateral investment treaties [hereinafter referred as BITs] which contain substantive, as well as procedural guarantees, to the foreign investors​[9]​. This tendency marks the development of an international legal framework for the protection of foreign investments. 

This framework originally rested on the customary international rules concerning state responsibility for injuries to aliens and their property. However, as these rules were uncertain and inadequate for the protection of foreign investments, an extensive network of international investment treaties (alternatively, international investment agreements - IIAs) started to be concluded​[10]​. Nowadays, the IIAs are the primary public international law instruments governing the promotion and protection of foreign investments​[11]​. In general, the only international rules that applied to some aspects of foreign investment were rules of customary international law, and their application was purely exceptional. Whether investments treaties actually benefit potential host states is debatable.

 To date both national investment legislation and BITs offer comprehensive protection to foreign investors by setting down principles of substantive investment protection, including national and most‐favored‐nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, protection against expropriation without compensation, and free capital transfer. They also allow investors to enforce these standards in arbitral proceedings directly against the host state, most commonly under the ICSID. Investment treaty arbitration thereby not only empowers foreign investors under international law, but also introduces investment treaty tribunals as novel actors into the arena of international investment law.

In theory the BITs aim at attracting foreign investments through offering foreign investors broad substantive treaty protection and the flexibility to directly resolve investment claims through international arbitration usually under the framework of the ICSID.  Indeed, procedural rights contained in investment treaties offering foreign investors the possibility of direct investor-state arbitration have been appropriately described as the ‘‘ultimate investor protection’’. Arguably, states envision that by concluding BITs offering substantive treaty rights including the right to direct investor-state arbitration reluctant foreign investors will be persuaded to transfer foreign capital that would otherwise not have been transferred had the investor not been assured of favourable treaty protection. However, over the last decade, the modern investment regime as is loosely articulated in the corpus of BITs is witnessing increased scrutiny and growing level of discontents​[12]​. The discontent with the investment regime relates to concerns that include, inter alia, ambiguity in treaty language, expansive interpretation by arbitral tribunals and the need for a more inclusive regime that balances the interests of foreign investors’ vis-à-vis interests of sovereign states. Foreign investment law is about to become one of the most significant fields in the practice of public international law of relevance to practitioners, and also in developing states such as Tanzania. Against this background, it was proper to undertake a detailed analysis of treaties concluded by Tanzania with the objective of establishing the investment treaty practice of the country.  In so doing, the study examines whether Tanzania treaty practice conforms with or differs from international investment law and whether it is in conformity with its BITs contents. While reviewing the treaty practice of the country the study also explores the extent to which the emerging investment treaty practice interferes or restrains legitimate policy making in the country.

1.2 Statement of the Problem
The problem addressed in this study is whether Tanzania treaty practice conforms with or differs from international investment law and whether it is in conformity with its BITs contents. In Tanzania there has been a remarkable increase in a number of BITS since 1990​[13]​ and other international investment agreements or as part of broader regional trade agreements more specifically in the Tanzania context, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to mention those few. Hence, a sharp increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) to Tanzania. The total FDI in 1992 was 12 million USD only but by the end of 2011 the FDI value has increased to the tune of approximately 1.1 billion USD. The FDI stock amounted to 388 million USD in 1990 compared to 7.8 billion USD in 2012​[14]​. The number and scope of treaties governing foreign direct investment continues to increase and, as the result of investor-state arbitration provisions in many of these treaties, so does the potential that state regulation that affects property rights may breach international investment obligations. The evidence​[15]​shows that in the country many investments projects are subject to public discourse as a result of the conflicting interest between the property rights of the citizens and that of the investors as stipulated in their respective agreements. Thus, in some cases these disputes require the country to depend on law enforcement agencies to quell public opposition to the project in order to balance between the right of the government to undertake regulatory functions in the public interest, and the right of foreign investors to carry on their business without arbitrary or unlawful interference.​[16]​ Although BITs are country specific, the existing literature generally treats them as one regime. It was thus important to review treaties from Tanzanian perspective and explore whether treaties concluded by the country contain any nuances different from other existing treaties. Particularly, the over generalization of the BITs as one regime misses important differences such as whether a country enters into BITs and with whom, how it approaches the key substantive standards, what influences a country or region to conclude the BITs, the extent to which the BITs restrain a country’s legitimate legislation, and how the country approaches dispute settlement. Therefore these are the apparent problems addressed in this study.
1.3 Research Questions
The central question which the research addresses is the Tanzania treaty practice conforms with or differs from international investment law? 
 In order to fully answer this question, a number of secondary questions were raised, which include;
(i)	What are the salient features of the international investment protection agreements signed by Tanzania?
(ii)	What are the legal impacts of international investment protections provided for in investment treaties entered by Tanzania on national investment related legislations?
(iii)	Is there a balance between the rights and duties of investors and states in Tanzania’s treaty practice?

1.4  Objectives of the Study
1.4.1 General Objective
Generally this study seeks to examine the extent to which Tanzania treaty practice conforms with or differs from international investment law.
1.4.2 Specific Objectives 
In particular this study intended:
(i)  	Examines investment protection provisions in international investment agreements signed by Tanzania.
(ii) 	Examines the legal impact of international investment protections provided for in investment treaties entered by Tanzania on national investment related legislations.
(iii) 	Analyses the extent to which Tanzania treaty practice balances rights and duties of investors. 
1.5  Significance of the Study
This study intends to provide an insight on the development and application of the legal framework governing international investment law and foreign investment protection, in general, and in Tanzania, in particular.
Also the research contributes to the broader literature on procedure of international dispute settlement, in general, and international investment dispute settlement, in particular, thus generally the finding of this study implicitly revives the focus group knowledge to the issue of settlement of investment disputes in Tanzania. An informed understanding of legal framework governing international investment law and foreign investment protection, therefore combined with its proper interpretation and application as enshrined in the mechanisms of  treaties, contributes positively towards the objective of ‘‘enhancing the legal security of international economic life in Tanzania.”

1.6 Scope of the Study
The scope of this study focuses on investment treaty practice of Tanzania. The BITs and legislations that were main focus of the work were limited to Tanzania mainland as investment in Tanzania is not a union matter;​[17]​Zanzibar is constitutionally justified to have its own investment laws and indeed it does have. To this end, the discussion focuses only on Tanzanian Mainland. However, it should be stressed that although the main thrust of the study focuses on Tanzania Mainland where necessary the study made reference to other country’s BITs and Model BITs. But such reference is made only to serve as a suggestion on how the provision should be. In terms of literature the study relies heavily on the BITs concluded by Tanzania, national legislation, and investment cases concluded through international arbitration as well as books, journals, published and unpublished articles dealing with international investment law, theory and practices. 
1.7 Literature Review
The research seeks to study the legal framework governing international investment law and foreign investment protection with reference to Tanzania treaty practices.
This is not a novel issue.  Some literature does exist however, few writers have covered the specifics and there is no up-to-date monograph as of yet. In other words, the subject requires further research that provides a critical analysis of the existing legal framework and that highlights its deficiencies and shortcomings in relation to treaty practice in Tanzania. Maina and Mwakaje 2004​[18]​ are of the view that although the Tanzania Investment Act, 1997 provides more details than its precursor about the investment process and investment opportunities in Tanzania, it has some shortcomings, including failure to spell out the duties of the investor, double taxation, and two separate statutes to govern investments. The Act also has a weak dispute settlement mechanism, and only addresses foreign investors, not domestic investors. The authors are right but they only review the statutory law dealing with investment in Tanzania but they did not analyse and review the treaties signed by the country as they are compared with the relevant national legislation.

Graham​[19]​ submits that international investment agreements have a detrimental effect for developing countries. He argues that they limit a government’s ability to regulate in the public interest, especially where these interests run counter to the foreign investors. He adds that they restrict a country’s ability to enact measures responding to financial, social and economic crisis and they impede democratic processes. The author might be right but this is a general analysis of developing countries. The present research is specifically for Tanzania it aims at establishing whether such agreements have such effect. Collins et all​[20]​, argue that foreign investors can recourse their disputes to international commercial arbitration proceses only if the state granted its consent to arbitration by contracts. The author adds that this is not true in practice. This consent is through arbitration clauses; is only granted within the concession agreement; and will not cover other investment issues; hence, a foreign investor can only pursue litigation in host countries. Whether such treaty practice is true for Tanzania was the subject of the present study.  Schill​[21]​ argues that capital- exporting and capital-importing states although were still unable to agree on a common set of substantive rules for international investment relations, above all the appropriate level of protection of foreign investors, they agreed, by concluding the ICSID Convention in the mid-1960s, to establish multilateral rules for the procedural aspects of investor-state disputes. He adds that but they still disagreed on the extent of restrictions to be imposed on states regarding the treatment of foreign investors. With respect the author may be correct but whether Tanzania treaties are among those treaties which its provisions are in disagreement on the extent of restrictions imposed on the country regarding the treatment of foreign investors was the subject to this research.

Huiping​[22]​  argues that in an attempt to increase FDIs, many developing countries began to sign high standard BITs with highly protective investor-state dispute settlement mechanism  without fully considering negative consequences of such BITs - most of which have created regulatory challenges for policy makers by often challenging regulatory measures intended by states to protect public welfare. The author might be correct, but whether the BITs signed by Tanzania has the same effects to our country policy makers and may challenge any regulatory measure by the country intended to protect public interest was subject to this study.  Ikenson​[23]​ argues that BITs and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) give foreign investors privileges unavailable to domestic firms, and undermine state sovereignty by offering a means for investors to intimidate host governments to change policies arrived at through the democratic process. Whether Tanzania BITs has caused also the country to change policies to suit the treaty practice was subject to my research.

Poulsen​[24]​ shows that the IIA policy-making in developing countries has hardly followed a rational approach and policy-makers in these countries have insufficiently considered the risks involved when signing thousands of the IIAs. As a result of ISDS cases brought against them, more and more governments of developing countries have now realised that they signed up to an especially constraining set of international rules that are enforceable through independent, third-party arbitration mechanisms. The author focuses his view to general developing countries with no reference to Tanzania experience. Shaw​[25]​ is of the view that the BITs are the ones which frequently provide for the recourse to international arbitration, especially under the ICSID Tribunal in the event of an investment dispute between foreign investor and the host state.

Tienhaara​[26]​ argues that investment treaties do not offer states sufficient regulatory space or appropriate deference to regulate in the public interest. Although the author addresses the effect of treaties, he did not address the impact with aspect of the treaty practice of Tanzania which is the aim of this study. Aust​[27]​ when explaining the advantages of BITs, he submits that the BITs gives the foreign investors the right to take the host states to international arbitration fora, and that they do not have to exhaust local remedies initially. He adds that such a process is compulsory and once the investors invoke it; there is no requirement of the host state to agree to the arbitration. The author might be right but he seems to overlook the requirement of consent of host states to international arbitration as required by the ICSID Convention and BITs. He also overlooks the fact that some of those BITs do refer settlement of disputes by either local courts or international tribunals (“fork in the road” clause). This is why it is necessary for this study to consider whether Tanzania signed treaties do require a consent of the parties on the case to case basis or not and the issue of exhaustion of local remedies in the country. 

Paulsen and Aishett​[28]​ they argue that many BIT negotiators from developing countries do not thoroughly assess the implication of signing BITs and do not take decisions seriously, partly due to lack of capacity and expertise. Their argument might be correct but they do not explain the treaty practice of Tanzania; which the present study aims at establishing whether it is true for Tanzania or not. Suchman and Edelman​[29]​ are of the view that no aspect of BIT practice has been more informative to governments than investor-state dispute. International treaties, like some domestic law, contain substantial ambiguities that are only clarified overtime as the rules are implemented and enforced. The authors does not fully analyse the BIT practices and also they does not explain what are those ambiguities in treaties or domestic law. As seen above specialized studies on foreign investment legal framework in Tanzania are scarce, this study makes use of other general studies on treaties which analyse the treaty practice for rationale of this research. And therefore unexplored issues about legal framework for protection of foreign investments in Tanzania by the above authors were subject of the discussion of this research.

1.8 Limitation of the Study
Although the study has met its objectives there were some limitations. First time and resources were the main hindrances to this study. Second internet research also poses a challenge as the researcher has not subscribed to any electronic legal libraries. Hence the materials accessed on the internet are only those that are freely available on line.

1.9 Research Methodology
The proposed study basically is explorative research, mostly qualitative which constitute a desk and library based research. It involves qualitative analysis of all provisions in Tanzania BITs to determine their conformity with or difference from international investment law. Therefore the study adopted a legal doctrinal or ‘black letter law’ methodology; that is to say the study is based on analysing the legal rules under the international legal framework for foreign investment protection and their logical connections or disjunctions via examination of the cases, the wording and interpretation of the treaties, as well as existing literature. This approach enables the researcher to critically analyse the meanings and implications of these rules and the principles which underpin them. The study mostly relied on the primary and secondary sources of law to address the focus and aim of this study.
 
The primary sources of law included, the negotiated and signed bilateral investment treaties, relevant legislation and decided disputes which was collected and then analysed.  Secondary sources included policy statements, books, research papers, articles, journals and other commentaries on case laws which were relevant to the study.  The sources were gathered from different libraries found in Dar es salaam, Tanzania: the Open University of Tanzania library, the University of Dar es salaam library and the Tanzania High Court Commercial Division library. The sources were useful in this study as it provided various information from different legal scholars on what they have written on the issue of international legal framework for foreign investment protection.

Information was also gathered from different websites such as, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) website, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) website, and the United Nations Trade Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website, in order to obtain the sources that were unavailable in the said libraries such as arbitral tribunal cases and bilateral investment treaties which was useful and helped to understand the general aspect of protection of foreign investment.  The study thoroughly examines treaties concluded by Tanzania. The reason for selecting Tanzania is that the country not only concluded BITs but also has experienced litigation under the ICSID arbitral rules. Various legal methods, more specifically rules of statutory interpretations and legal reasoning such as deductive reasoning was applied in appropriate circumstances as it was proper for the legal doctrine research method employed in the study. The legal approach was both describing what the law is and how it operates currently and proposing what the law ought to be and how it ought to operate.

1.10 Organization of Dissertation
The dissertation consists five chapters divided into several but interrelated parts. An introductory chapter presenting an overview of the study topic, a definition of the research problem, methodology for data collection and analysis, guiding research questions, objective and significance of the study, literature review and scope of the research. Chapter Two provides an overview of the international legal framework for foreign investment protection which is based upon standards of treatment of foreign investor established by bilateral treaties, multilateral treaties, customary international law, domestic law, international contracts and other international rules and regulations such as the World Bank’s guidelines on the treatment of foreign direct investments and the WTO systems. Such instruments are carefully analyzed and summarized in order to insight into the international legal regime for foreign investment protection.

Chapter Three critically reviews trends in Tanzania’s treaty practice, such as decision by the governments whether to sign or not sign treaties, the evolution of treaty drafting on scope of application, investment protection, investment liberalization and dispute settlement, and the inclusion of provisions on responsible investment and sustainable development in order to establish the extent to which Tanzania treaty practice conforms with or differs from international investment law. 

Chapter Four identifies the implication of international legal framework on Tanzania foreign investment related legislation, more specifically the impact of increased protection of foreign investment through BITs on the regulatory power of the country. Under the chapter, the potential conflicts between investment treaty provisions and the country investment related legislation is explored through analysis of some provisions and cases decided by arbitral tribunals.









2.0 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROTECTION
2.1 Introduction
In the last two decades of the 20th century, great changes have taken place in policies and legal structures relating to foreign investments. The rapid changes in foreign investment have found their expression in numerous bilateral and multilateral investment treaties. In the past, foreign investment was largely regulated domestically. In general, the only international rules that applied to some aspects of foreign investment were rules of customary international law, and their application was purely exceptional. With the adoption of bilateral investment treaties beginning in the 1980s, an international legal framework started to emerge. Both developed and developing countries were eager to negotiate investment rules in order to further transnational investments.  The legal framework for foreign investment protection can be looked from different angles such as standards of treatment of foreign investor established by bilateral treaties, multilateral treaties, customary international law, domestic law, international contracts and other international rules and regulations such as the World Bank’s guidelines on the treatment of foreign direct investments and the WTO systems.

2.2 Bilateral and Regional Investment Treaties  
 BITs are agreements entered into between two countries whereby they mutually undertake to protect the investment of persons and corporations from one country which is made in the other country. A common provision of the BITs is that the parties provide reciprocal protection and create favourable conditions for investments by investors of either contracting state. The BITs provide a definition of what would be construed as an investment, and the reciprocal standards of protection to investors from one contracting state which will be entitled to in the other contracting state. Common standards of investment protection found in BITs include undertakings that investments would enjoy national treatment, most-favoured nation provisions, fair and equitable treatment, free and unrestricted transfer of returns out of the host country, and that such investment will not be directly or indirectly expropriated or nationalised without the payment of adequate compensation.​[30]​ The BITs also often contain provisions that disputes concerning investments between a contracting state and an investor from the other contracting state be resolved through arbitration. These dispute resolution provisions are often invoked by investors to institute arbitral proceedings against host states at the ISCID or by way of international commercial arbitration.​[31]​

While the investment protection provided for in the BITs are fairly adequate for contemporary foreign investors, these investment protection measures are limited to only the investors who are nationalities of countries whose BITs with host states are in force.In addition; the past decade has seen a rapid increase in regional investment agreements among more than two states. There have been several regional treaties on foreign investment such as the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which creates a framework for the free movement of investments within the NAFTA region. The treaty provides for a strong investor state dispute settlement mechanism, giving the investor a unilateral right to invoke arbitration against the host state. There has been much case law generated under the NAFTA, and considerable literature has been generated because much of this case law indicates that the NAFTA will provide restraints on the exercise of regulatory powers by states. There are other regional treaties. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investment (ASEAN) contained strong provisions for protection of foreign investments. The later ASEAN framework Agreement on Investments, however, created the concept of an ‘ASEAN Investor’ and permitted freedom of movement within the ASEAN area to the entity or person who fell within the definition. These earlier ASEAN treaties have now been replaced with a new treaty, the ASEAN Comprehensive Treaty on Investments. 

Other regional treaties, such as the Mercosur Agreement, create similar regional arrangements with protection granted in varying degrees to the foreign investment of the participating regional states. There is an increasing practice to negotiate free trade agreements. Some of them are bilateral, and some are regional. These agreements contain provisions on investment protection.  While all these multilateral agreements are limited to a specific region, no global investment agreement exists to date. Negotiations under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to adopt a global agreement on investment  the MAI failed in 1998 when countries realized that granting extensive investor protection could lead to serious problems for the host state to regulate in areas such as the environment and public health and that the negative effects of a far reaching investment agreement could outweigh the benefits of investment liberalization and investor protection.​[32]​ 

2.2.1 Substantive International Investment Law: Investment Liberalization and Investor Protection 
Investment treaties, both bilateral and regional, usually incorporate two types of issues.
One group of provisions concerns investment liberalization, the other covers investor protection. The former category is based on the idea that investment liberalization leads to higher economic efficiency. These provisions aim at a decrease or elimination of restrictions on the entry and operation of foreign investment in a host country. The range of investment liberalization obligations contained in investment treaties varies significantly. Any liberalization provisions are limited, and linked closely to the goal of protecting established investment. It should be noted here that investment liberalization commitments do not mean that no domestic laws are to be applied to the investment, either as it is being made or subsequently. Rather, the commitment is to remove any discrimination between the covered foreign investor and the domestic investors in that sector. As a result, and importantly, the liberalization commitment is often found simply in the national treatment and/or most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment provisions of an agreement.

For example, the commitment in the Tanzania – Canada BIT arises in Article 4(1) on National Treatment:

“each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments.”

The second group of provisions concerns the protection of foreign investments against government action once established in the host country. Both groups of provisions are included in virtually all investment agreements in varying forms. A brief overview of the substantive rules that are usually included in investment treaties and related concerns are described below.

2.2.1.1 National Treatment 
Under most investment treaties, the host country must treat the foreign investors no less favorably than it treats domestic investors in like circumstances. While at first blush this requirement seems unobjectionable, in practice the national treatment obligation is problematic because it requires the comparison of activities that are not necessarily easy to compare.  National treatment provisions require a host state to treat foreign investors and investments at least as well as they treat their own investors. As such, national treatment provisions limit the use of preferential laws and policies to favour nationally owned investments. 
Depending on how these provisions are drafted, they may also limit a host government’s ability to implement regulations that are more difficult for foreign investors to comply with, even if those regulations apply equally to domestic and foreign firms.

Most investment treaties contain national treatment provisions but there is significant variation in the way that they are drafted. These national treatment provisions of investment treaties they apply to the treatment of investment after the investment has been made that is, the post-establishment phase and before that is pre establishment phase. At least with respect to the post-establishment phase of an investment, national treatment aims at creating a level playing field between local and foreign investors as a prerequisite for equal competition. Most BITs contain either a specific clause that prohibits “discriminatory measures concerning the management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion, or disposal of investments​[33]​,” or a general nondiscrimination clause that either separates between national and MFN treatment or frames them as part of a single treaty provision. Some BITs, for example, contain so-called “grandfather clauses” that only forbid the introduction of new discriminatory measures, while allowing the retention of existing discriminations​[34]​. The granting of national treatment after entry may confer advantages on aliens, as it will grant them the same privileges enjoyed by nationals. Some of the BITs contain national treatment provisions with the clarification that the obligation to treat foreign investments no less favourably than domestic investments only applies insofar as the comparison is between investments “in like circumstances.”​[35]​ This phrase responds to concerns about the way in which arbitral tribunals have interpreted and applied national treatment provisions in investor state disputes. For example, in one case a tribunal held that a foreign investor in the oil and gas sector had not been granted national treatment because it was subjected to a less favourable taxation regime than that applied to domestic investors in the agricultural sector.​[36]​ 
This trade-related term ‘in like circumstances’ is used to limit the effect of the national treatment requirement. It is difficult to understand the nature of such a limitation in the context of investment. A large multinational corporation as an investor is never ‘in like circumstances’ because of its size and vertically integrated global organisation. This formulation does not imply equality of treatment, as it leaves open the possibility for host countries to offer foreign investors a more favorable treatment than that granted to its national investors. National treatment may have far reaching consequences for economic development policy because national companies cannot be favoured over foreign companies e.g. incentives, subsidies to mention those few, unless it is so stipulated by the way of exception in the BITs. Exceptions to national treatment can be of a general nature, as those typically based on the right to treat domestic and foreign investors in certain types of activities or industries differently for reasons of national economic and social policy. Similarly, they could avoid extending to foreign investors the same treatment granted to investors from countries which are partners to an economic integration arrangement, an issue that is closely related to the most favored nation clauses of investment agreements. The national treatment obligations also apply to the admission, establishment, acquisition and expansion of investments i.e., at the pre-establishment phase. The pre-establishment national treatment provisions are not always included in investment treaties. When included, they govern a host state’s ability to limit or regulate the entry of foreign investment.​[37]​ 

The pre-establishment national treatment does not require a host state to allow unconditional market access to foreign investors.  It require a host state to provide treatment to foreign investors that is no less favourable than the treatment provided to domestic investors in respect of the “acquisition, expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and sale or other disposal of investments”.  Host states may still impose restrictions or conditions on foreign investments, provided that the same restrictions or conditions are applied to investments made by national investors from the host state. 

The national treatment provisions aims at giving the obligations to the contracting parties to give the same treatment to foreign investor that is at least favourable like that given to the national investor. In theory, this treatment is intended to create a level playing field for the foreign investors and host state investors. But in practice this is not because the two kind of investors are not identical, treating two different groups differently may not amount to discrimination, that’s why the BIT include exception provision. The extension of this to pre-establishment rights removing governments’ rights to pre-screen investments further reduces chances for host countries to enact policies that will specifically benefit domestic entrepreneurs.

2.2.1.2 Most Favored Nation Standard of Treatment
Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment in the context of foreign investment means that, “a host country treats investors from one foreign country no less favorably than investors from any other foreign country.” The idea is to promote equality of competitive opportunities between foreign investors and to provide a level playing field amongst them. Like constitutional protections of equality, such clauses are regularly drafted in a broad and general way. A typical clause thus stipulates: “Each Party shall accord to such investments treatment which in any case shall not be  less favorable than that accorded either to investments of its own investors or to investments of investors of any third country, whichever is most favorable to the investor concerned”​[38]​. Occasionally, MFN provisions are subject to exceptions​[39]​. Some BITs, for example, contain so-called “grandfather clauses” that only forbid the introduction of new discriminatory measures, while allowing the retention of existing discriminations​[40]​. Although host countries may express reservations or exceptions in the application of the MFN treatment vis a vis different States, nonetheless, the way they are formulated tends in practice to restrict this objective because the host country is required to ensure that the application be temporarily and does not affect the foreign investment and companies.​[41]​
2.2.1. 3 Fair and Equitable Standard of Treatment
While the national and MFN treatments constitute relative standards that depend on the treatment accorded to a reference group, investment treaties also impose standards of treatment on host states, such as fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security, that are absolute in character and grant protection to foreign investors independent of the host state’s treatment of its own nationals or of third-party nationals. In this context, the BITs regularly provide that; “[i]nvestments of investors of each Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security in the territory of the other Contracting Party​[42]​.” 

Alternatively, some treaties explicitly provide that under fair and equitable treatment and full protection host States “shall in no case accord treatment less favorable than that required by international law​[43]​.”  In view of the little specific obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment and to provide full protection and security, the exact content of both standards has not been authoritatively determined and remains contested. In particular, although the standard of fair and equitable treatment easily finds passage in nearly all BITs, it is probably the most controversial and complex undertaking for states engaged in modern investment treaty practice.  In fact, the jurisprudence of investment tribunals interpreting fair and equitable treatment regularly has recourse to certain sub-elements that run parallel to the concept of the rule of law in domestic legal systems. In this context, fair and equitable treatment is interpreted to include the requirement of stability and predictability of the legal framework, consistency in the host State’s decision-making, the principle of legality, the protection of confidence or legitimate expectations, procedural due process and the prohibition of denial of justice, the protection against discrimination and arbitrariness, the requirement of transparency, and the concept of reasonableness and proportionality​[44]​. 

The standard of full protection and security, in turn, is closely connected to the fair and equitable treatment standard. Unlike fair and equitable treatment, which primarily protects the investor against interferences by the host state, full protection and security requires positive action by the host state in establishing and enforcing a legal framework for the protection of foreign investment and in protecting the physical integrity and safety of foreign investments against interference by private actors, such as demonstrating or rioting individuals.  Apart from providing police protection, full protection and security is also violated if state conduct actually infringes upon the physical safety of foreign investments outside the scope of law enforcement. This standard was, therefore, held to be violated in a case of destruction of foreign-owned property by the host state’s armed forces​[45]​. Both fair and equitable and full protection and security treatment standards, ensure basic requirements connected to the concept of the rule of law, namely that the state has to act vis-à-vis individual economic actors through the means of the law, but also has an obligation to protect the physical and economic integrity, safety, and security of its subjects against unlawful interference by private and government actors.

2.2.1.4 Minimum Standard of Treatment  
Many investment treaties include a minimal treatment standard that requires a host state treat the foreign investor in accordance with international minimum standards of fair and equitable treatment. Customary international law requires states to have a minimum standard of treatment of investors and the traditional notion of diplomatic protection and treatment of aliens. It is the notion of diplomatic protection of citizens and their property abroad by home country that gave rise to modern rules of foreign investment law. BITs or MITs that require the host states to extend the international minimum standard of protection to both aliens and their property has extended the idea to the host state. It is submitted that when the BITs prescribe treating the foreign investor in accordance with customary international law, they should be understood to mean the standard of international law embodied in the terms of some two thousand BITs. The minimum standard of international law is the contemporary standard​[46]​.

One should refer to the meaning of the minimum standard of treatment to be certain whether they interact or not. Roth defines it as ‘nothing else than a set of rules, correlated to each other and deriving from one particular norm of general international law, namely that the treatment of aliens is regulated by the law of nations’​[47]​. Other scholars define the minimum standard of treatment in terms of comparison between it and national treatment​[48]​. In this regard, Brownlie explains that the international minimum standard is a moral standard for civilised countries as opposed to the principle of national treatment​[49]​. Furthermore, Asante also asserted that, according to the doctrine of State responsibility, “Host states are enjoined by international law to observe an international minimum standard in the treatment of aliens and alien property. The duty to observe this standard objective international standard is not necessarily discharged by according to aliens and alien property the same treatment available to nationals. Where national standards fall below the international minimum standard, the latter prevails.”​[50]​ Moreover, Root, argued that, “there was a standard of justice which formed part of international law [and that] if any country’s system of law does not conform to that standard, although the people of the country may be content or compelled to live under it, no other country can be compelled to accept it as furnishing a satisfactory measure of treatment to its citizens.”​[51]​ In my view such arguments creates a link between BIT and Customary international law.

Generally, treaty rules and customary international rules may co-exist and be applied independently.​[52]​ However, there is no hierarchy between them.​[53]​ Instead, treaty rules are considered as lex specialis and this is particularly evident in bilateral treaties.​[54]​  For that reason an intense and continuous interaction occurs in different forms between bilateral investment treaties and customary rules. As it has been recently argued by Lowenfeld that “taken together, the [BITs] are now evidence of customary international law, applicable even when a given situation or controversy is not explicitly governed by a treaty.”​[55]​ Therefore interaction between bilateral investment treaties and customary international law is in place. They both intensely interact and constantly affect each other. The issue of standard of treatment of foreign investors has resulted to the inclusion of provisions in both national laws and international instrument agreement of the standard of treatment that provides protection against discrimination of investors in a foreign state. Accordingly, it may be concluded from the above that the International Minimum Standard of Treatment called for the basic standards of justice, non-discrimination, due-process, fairness, equity and basic human rights including right to property to be accorded to foreign investors. This ensured investors protection against political risk of expropriation i.e. taking of property or other assets by host States for a public purpose on a non-discriminatory basis in accordance with due process of law, with prompt, adequate and effective compensation.

2.2.1.5 Performance Requirements
Investment agreements prohibit the use of a number of “performance requirements,” which have traditionally been used by developing countries to ensure that foreign investment furthered their developmental goals. Examples of performance requirements include technology transfer obligations, local hiring and training requirements, and domestic content rules. Being able to guide incoming investments so that they meet local and national priorities is critical to harness private investment to further environmentally and socially sustainable development.  Performance requirements are requirements concerning the location or the origin of the inputs, outputs or activities associated with an investment. Examples of performance requirements include requirements that a foreign investor use a certain percentage of host states produced inputs, requirements that investors export a minimum percentage of their output and requirements that investors employ a certain percentage of host states staff. From the outset, it is important to note that some types of performance requirements are prohibited by the WTO’s Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) treaty,​[56]​ specifically local-content requirements, trade-balancing requirements, and export limits.​[57]​  Most other forms of performance requirements notably, requirements related to employment, research and requirements to form partnerships or joint venture arrangements with local firms are not prohibited by the TRIMs treaty. For example the Tanzania–Canada BIT covers a much broader range of performance requirements it prohibits, among others, to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content and to transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge to a person in its territory.

2.2.1.6 Expropriation    
A central provision of investment agreements is a prohibition on uncompensated expropriation or taking of investors’ assets. Brownlie notes that expropriation per se is lawful provided it is carried out for a public purpose, follows due process is non discriminatory and the measures are accompanied with the payment of prompt adequate and effective compensation.​[58]​ Almost all BITs contain expropriation clauses; but it is rare for those clauses to specifically define what constitutes an expropriation. They contain generalised expropriation clauses which do not explain the scope of expropriation and the extent of government interference required for compensable regulatory expropriation.​[59]​ For instance, Article 5(1) of the Tanzania-UK BIT which provides that nationals or companies of either contracting party shall not be:
“Nationalised, expropriated or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation...in the territory of the other Contracting Party except for a public purpose related to the internal needs of that Party on a non-discriminatory basis and against prompt, adequate and effective compensation…”

Although the expropriation clause contained in the Tanzania-UK BIT does not explicitly state concepts such as indirect expropriation, creeping expropriation and de facto expropriation, these terms can be construed from the wording of the expropriation clause. Indeed, the tribunal in Biwater v United Republic of Tanzania found that Article 5 (1) of the Tanzania-U K BIT was broadly framed to encompass both formal taking (direct expropriation) but also de facto expropriation or indirect taking that does not involve actual taking of title but nonetheless results in effective loss of property.​[60]​

Most of the provisions of the BITs in investment treaties deal with two distinct situations. The first is “direct expropriation,” which occurs when a government nationalizes or permanently takes over possession of an investment. The second is “measures equivalent to expropriation,” more commonly referred to as “indirect expropriation.” Indirect expropriation occurs when a government takes a measure akin to expropriation that does not involve nationalization or the ousting of the investor from possession of the investment. Such actions may include regulatory takings that affect the value of investment or render it economically not viable and hence requiring compensation​[61]​. It is not necessary that it should be an isolated event or that the host country should try to take ownership of the investment. The question of whether government measures that prevents a foreign investment from continuing to operate profitably amount to “indirect expropriation” for which compensation is required has proved controversial in practice. Investors have brought claims to investor state arbitration arguing that government decisions not to renew an investor’s operating permit,​[62]​ or to ban the use of chemicals that are harmful to human health, amount to indirect expropriations.​[63]​  The Tanzania- Canada BIT clarifies what is meant by “indirect expropriation,” that determining whether an indirect expropriation has occurred requires a case-by-case inquiry that shall consider, among other factors:
(a) 	the economic impact of the measure or series of measures, although the sole fact that a measure or series of measures of a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment shall not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred;
(b) 	the extent to which the measure or series of measures interfere with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and
 (c) 	the character of the measure or series of measures.​[64]​

The Tanzania- Turkey BIT also clarify that non-discriminatory regulatory measures designed to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.​[65]​ This gives guidance to arbitral tribunals and helps make the interpretation of this provision more predictable. 
Most investment treaties endorse the basic principle that compensation should be equivalent to the fair market value of the investment at the time when the expropriation was announced. While this standard of compensation is common to investment treaties, its application can lead to anomalous results in practice. For example, if an investor acquires an investment for significantly less than its fair market value perhaps because a competitive tender was not originally conducted it would still be entitled to full compensation if the investment was renationalized, a situation that would grant the investor a substantial windfall. For the country to consider alternatives to the fair market value standard for compensation, the SADC Model Investment Treaty provides an example of how a provision could be drafted so that compensation does take into account the circumstances in which an investment is acquired.​[66]​
2.2.1.7 Investor to State Dispute Settlement  
 In the past, disputes concerning the application of a treaty or the interpretation of its provisions were primarily resolved by state-to-state arbitration or adjudication before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). For example, in the post-World War II era, treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation to which the United States. was a party usually included a state to state dispute settlement mechanism to resolve investment disputes. The negotiation of bilateral investment treaties in the early 1980s, however, brought a shift in the resolution of disputes and began to introduce investor to state arbitration rules. Investor to state dispute settlement extends to investors the right to initiate international arbitration proceedings against the host state if the investor believes that one of the host state’s obligations has been breached. In the past few years, investors have used this mechanism aggressively to push their agenda.

The dispute settlement provisions included in the various investment treaties usually refer to arbitration mechanisms, such as the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), part of the World Bank Group, the arbitration facilities of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris, or the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) among others. Some dispute settlement clauses do not refer to any particular arbitral institution but instead refer ad-hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL arbitration or other rules. While under ICSID rules cases launched are publicly registered and listed on ICSID’s web site, other arbitration mechanisms do not publicize cases at all. No arbitration rules, including those under ICSID, require open hearings or public access to documents and decisions. The investor state dispute settlement system itself is fragment​ed with various venues on offer for arbitration, each with its own rules of procedure, history and culture. Arbitrators are chosen in an ad hoc manner and, in the absence of an appellate process that ensures con​sistency and the correct application of international law, the system is prone to inconsistent and diverging interpretations in cases addressing the same provisions and similar facts. Recurring inconsistent awards and interpretations by panels deepen the uncertainty about the mean​ing of key treaty obligations and compound the problems of the un​predictability of treaties. There is also growing evidence of dissenting views among members of panels.​[67]​ 

2.3 Concession Contracts  
 Concession contracts also known as called host government agreements constitute an important element of the international investment regime. They are entered into by governments and foreign investors to discipline their undertakings in investment projects.
Through these concession contracts, foreign investors usually acquire rights to explore and exploit natural resources, including for example access to water, forests, minerals, fisheries, etc. In spite of the fact that access to natural resources raises important public interest concerns, these contracts are negotiated behind closed doors, without public consultations. The covert character of these contracts greatly undermines the ability of civil society to raise public interest concerns. Concession contracts also provides for the settlement of disputes arising from the interpretation and application of the contract. Some provides for international arbitration often in the framework of ICSID, other contracts provide for settlement through the host state’s domestic courts or through arbitration under the local law. Difficulties arises where the contract provide for dispute settlement through domestic courts while an applicable treaty provide for international arbitration. International tribunals have held that they have jurisdictions for claims based on treaty breaches while disputes based on contract would have to be brought before the domestic courts or tribunal.​[68]​
2.4 Multi-lateral Investment Treaties   
MITs are international investment agreements which are entered into collectively by more than two states. MITs are similar to BITs except that parties have obligations among themselves inter se, to the extent that they have made reservations. Below are few examples of the MITs which are part of international investment legal framework.
i. 	General Agreement on Trade in Services 
A good example is the GATS, administered by the Word Trade Organization and subject to the WTO dispute settlement procedures.​[69]​ The provision of services abroad, for example, banking or accounting or shipping management or engineering consultancy services will usually require the establishment of some kind of commercial presence in the state to which the services are supplied. That presence may be a branch or a subsidiary or an agency; but whatever form it takes, the establishment of the presence buying or leasing the premises, hiring the staff, and so on will in effect be the making of an investment in the host state. And the conditions on which access to the market is given, and the provision of the services takes place, are matters of exactly the same kind as are covered by the investor protections under the BITs. There may, therefore, be a considerable overlap between the GATS and BITs. A full account of the legal landscape would require a consideration of instruments such as the GATS, which have a direct effect upon investments but which have a different focus. 

ii. 	International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
The ICSID was established at the initiative of the World Bank in order to encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) which was seen as a primary vehicle for economic development, and with it social and political development. The role of the ICSID is essentially supportive. The ICSID itself does not monitor investments or resolve investment disputes. Rather, it performs the administrative functions necessary to establish and support the operation of international arbitration tribunals. 

The ICSID Convention and associated rules regulate the conduct of arbitration and conciliation procedures under auspices of the ICSID. The Convention also provides for the determination of challenges to awards rendered by the ICSID tribunals, and for the recognition and enforcement of final awards by the courts of the ICSID States Parties. While both arbitration and conciliation are possible under the ICSID Convention, arbitration is much the more popular option. The ICSID is, therefore, a pre-arranged procedure; a system for the handling of investment disputes between one ICSID member state and nationals of another ICSID member state. Most of Investment codes and BITs provide that if a dispute is not resolved by negotiation, the investor is entitled to have resort to arbitration in accordance with the ICSID rules​[70]​.  But the ICSID also has an Additional Facility, first adopted in 1978 when the ICSID had little business and was keen to attract more work. 

The Additional Facility rules permit the ICSID to administer arbitration and conciliation procedures where either the host state or the national state of the investor is an ICSID party, but because one of those two states is not an ICSID state party the ICSID Convention is, strictly speaking, not applicable. The great advantage of the ICSID system is that it is comprehensive and self-contained. Clear rules for arbitrations are laid down; and the tribunals, whose members are freely chosen by the disputing parties. The ICSID Convention sets out very limited grounds on which alone ICSID awards may be challenged, in proceedings before specially appointed ad hoc ICSID annulment panels; and this helps to minimise challenges to the validity of arbitral awards; and the Convention also provides that the ICSID awards must be given the same recognition and enforcement by ICSID member states as would be given to a final judgment of a court in that state.

iii. 	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
The MIGA was established in 1988 within the World Bank group of international organizations, in order to promote foreign investments and, in turn international development. It does so by providing three main services. The first is insurance against political risks, including losses resulting from war risks, expropriation, the imposition of currency transfer restrictions, and non-payment of judgments or awards against a host state arising from the breach or repudiation of a contract. The cover is available from the MIGA for investors from any of the 167 State Parties to the MIGA who wish to invest in developing countries that are members of MIGA.  The MIGA’s primary tool for promoting and protecting foreign investment projects consists in offering an insurance scheme for foreign investors in developing countries. The second main role of the MIGA is to provide technical assistance to developing states in creating an environment that is conducive to investment and in attracting foreign investors. It provides both information and capacity-building training to developing states. This is complemented by the MIGA’s third main role, which is as an institutional mediator when investment disputes arise.   
          
The MIGA’s institutional position as a public, international, organization that sees secure investment as an essential element in development strategy, and which has the capital to back its commitments, gives it a particular influence with investors and host states alike in its mediation efforts. Thus, the MIGA has a mandate to conclude, based on the MFN treatment, agreements with developing countries that assure MIGA and the investments it insures certain standards of treatment. Furthermore, MIGA is charged with promoting and facilitating the conclusion of international investment treaties among its member states.  This mandate of promoting and protecting foreign investments in a multilateral forum further manifests the potential for multilateralism in international investment relations.

2.5 International Customary Law 
The customary international law also plays an important role in investment law. The international law minimum standards for the treatment of aliens are still relevant in a number of context in a number of context including denial of justice. Also the minimum standard principle has been adopted by most bilateral investment treaties as well as by investment protection agreements between host states and private investors. State responsibility is another area of international law that is frequently applied in cases​[71]​ involving the protection of investments. International rules on the nationality of individuals and corporations are sometimes important in determining the applicability of those BITs. Also the customary international law in the area of international investment protection concerns mainly the issues of expropriation and nationalization of foreign property. In international law, each nation state has the right to expropriate and nationalize property on its territory due to its inherent sovereignty rights. 

2.6 World Bank’s Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment  
The World Bank Group including, the International Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corporation and the MIGA prepared the Guidelines in 1992 at the request of the World community. The Guidelines were prepared by the World Bank to establish “general principles suggested as a guide for government but are intended to influence the promulgation of new laws and treaties. The aim of the Guidelines is to promote the international movement of capital. The Guidelines apply to supplement both BITs and Multilateral treaties and as a source of legislating national laws governing foreign investment.
2.7 Foreign Direct Investment under the World Trade Organization System and other International Systems
In the world trade context, special rules on investment first made an appearance through two agreements under the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.  These are the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  The framework these create is limited, however, and shortly thereafter the prospect of expanding the World Trade Organization (WTO) investment mandate was raised in the lead up to the first WTO Ministerial meeting, in Singapore in 1996.  The results of Singapore saw further analysis of trade and investment linkages mandated through a Working Group on Investment and Trade. The two WTO Agreements that currently address investment are the TRIMs and the GATS, as noted above.  The GATS incorporates rules on investment, but only in so far as it is necessary to address services that are provided by on-site investments, through a local presence (referred to as a “commercial presence” in the legal texts) in the foreign country.   The TRIMS agreement, on the other hand, was intended as a first step towards a much more comprehensive agreement on investment. States uses WTO’s Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs) to promote development objectives, to encourage investments in line with national priorities, and to attract and regulate foreign investment. 

2.8 Conclusion
The MIT, BITs and state signed Conventions together with domestic legislation provide a robust framework for the international protection of foreign investments. State’s entry into these investment treaties and ratifications of conventions into domestic legislations makes the protection mechanism part of their legal framework. The legal framework gives investors an avenue to seek remedy outside the domestic courts of the host states, against an act of government that have had a negative impact on their investment sometimes without exhaustion of local remedies.















3.0 TREND AND PATTERN OF TANZANIA’S TREATIY PRACTICE
3.1 Introduction
Tanzania signed the first BIT allowing for investor- state arbitration in 1996 with United Kingdom. Most of Tanzania treaties are based on the template negotiating positions of developed countries. For this reason, they are remarkably similar in their terms. During this period, only a handful of investment treaty claims were submitted to investor–state arbitration. As such, investment treaties attracted relatively little policy attention. Around the year 2000 the number of investor–state disputes being brought to arbitration began to increase sharply. Some of the arbitral tribunals adjudicating these claims adopted very broad interpretations of the underlying treaties, expanding host states’ obligations to foreign investors in ways that had not been anticipated when the agreements were originally signed. 

Recent trends in investment treaty-making reflect these experiences. Tanzania has responded by significantly revising its negotiating templates, seeking to provide greater clarity about the extent of particular obligations. Generally, the trend is toward a more cautious and better-informed approach to investment treaty making with narrower and more precise drafting of particular provisions. The following sections review these trends in Tanzania treaty practice.

3.2 Trends in the Negotiation and Drafting of Investment Treaties
In light of this background, Tanzania had been rethinking its approach to the drafting and negotiation of investment treaties. Generally, the trend points toward a greater caution in the drafting and negotiation of investment treaties, and specificity in treaty language to reduce the risk of unexpected interpretations by arbitral tribunals. 
About the decision whether or not to sign investment treaties, in recent years, several states have decided not to continue signing investment treaties.  For example, following a high-profile claim against the government’s affirmative action policies in the mining sector, the government of South Africa decided not to sign new investment treaties and has begun a process of terminating existing treaties. But Tanzania continues negotiating treaties with other states.

3.3 Trends in Drafting: Scope of Application
Most of the BITs negotiated by Tanzania after 1990s contain provisions that provide for a very broad scope of application. Thus, the trend has been toward narrower and more precise drafting of the provisions that define a treaty’s scope of application. In many cases, new treaty language responds to particular issues that have arisen in past disputes. For example the Tanzania –UK BIT which was signed in Dar es Salaam in January 1994 broadly defined an “investment” as “every kind of asset.” Thus such broad language counseled against using the narrow definition of “investment”. 

Also for example the broad language in the expropriation provision made the tribunal in Biwater v United Republic of Tanzania to find that Article 5 (1) of the Tanzania-UK BIT was broadly framed to encompass both formal taking (direct expropriation) but also de facto expropriation or indirect taking that does not involve actual taking of title but nonetheless results in effective loss of property.​[72]​  In contrast the Canada- Tanzania BIT which was signed in Dar es Salaam in December 1995 clarifies that a commercial contract for the sale of goods does not qualify as an “investment” entitled to the treaty’s protection.​[73]​ This responds to concerns that investment treaties could be held to apply to any cross-border business transaction.​[74]​

3.4 Trends in Drafting: Investment Protection
As I fore said investment treaties negotiated by Tanzania after 1990s contained a handful of broad, vaguely drafted provisions dealing with investment protection. For example, article 2(2) of the Tanzania -U.K BIT requires each party to provide “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” to the investments of investors of the other party. None of these terms are defined with greater precision. Arbitral tribunals have subsequently interpreted such provisions as requiring a state to ensure the stability of the legal framework and to act consistently with an investor’s legitimate expectations.​[75]​ The country has responded to these decisions which considerably expand the scope of states’ liability to foreign investors by drafting the investment protection provisions of new investment treaties more narrowly and more precisely and by including new exceptions clauses that protect governments’ rights to enact legitimate policy measures. 

The Sweden- Tanzania BIT clearly illustrates this trend. The treaty requires each state to provide “fair and equitable treatment” to foreign investment, subject to the requirement that investment “shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that required international law.”​[76]​ This text left open the possibility that the standard of “fair and equitable treatment” required by the treaty could go beyond what was required by international law. The corresponding provision of the investment treaty now requires “treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment.”​[77]​ This formulation removes the possibility that the requirement of “fair and equitable treatment” could be interpreted as going beyond what is otherwise required by customary international law. However, questions remain about the standard required by customary international law. This paragraph does not provide an exhaustive statement of the content of customary international law, so questions remain about precisely what customary international law requires. In contrast, the Canada- Tanzania BIT makes reference to “customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security”, and clarifies that the concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens..”​[78]​ 

In addition to the clearer and more balanced drafting of substantive protections, the trend in recent investment treaties has been toward the greater use of exceptions clauses to safeguard governments’ policy space. A good example of this trend is the Turkey- Tanzania and Canada- Tanzania BITs. These treaties include exceptions for government measures necessary to protect public health and for measures relating to environmental conservation, among others.​[79]​ Well-drafted exceptions clauses can help ensure that governments are not held liable for legitimate public policy measures that affect foreign investors. However, the precise effect of these provisions remains to be seen. For example, the public health exception of the Canada- Tanzania BIT only covers measures that are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.” Ultimately, it would be up to a tribunal to decide whether the public health measure introduced by a state were necessary and, therefore, exempt from liability under the treaty. The Tanzania treaty practice in investment protection is also relevant in connection with another aspect of the clause. Most treaties concluded by Tanzania have a model clause to the effect that “...Each Party shall in its territory accord to investments and returns of investors of the other Contracting Party treatment which is fair and equitable and no less favourable than that which it accords to investments and returns of its own investors or to investments and returns of investors of any third State,...”.​[80]​ 

While this clause applies to national treatment of foreign investors and most favours national treatment of foreign investors, it may also be understood to embrace the treatment required by a Government for its investors abroad, as evidenced by the treaties made to ensure their protection.

3.5 Trends in Drafting: Investment Liberalization
As Tanzania continues to sign investment treaties, there has also been a trend toward the inclusion of provisions governing investment liberalization. The most common liberalization guarantees in investment treaties are provisions that extend obligations to provide national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment to the pre-establishment phase. For example, the commitment in the Canada-Tanzania BIT arises in Article 4(1) on National Treatment:
“…each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments.”​[81]​
Tanzania also now includes restrictions on the use of performance requirements. The Tanzania–Canada BIT covers a broader range of performance requirements it prohibits, among others, to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content and to transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge to a person in its territory.​[82]​ It is submitted that this trend may raise a significant regulatory challenges for Tanzania. Tanzania is likely to be increasingly confronted with requests from negotiating partners to sign investment treaties that require investment liberalization.  If Tanzania decides to sign investment treaties containing such provisions, there is need for great care in ensuring that reservations and exceptions are included to prevent any inconsistency with existing laws. 

For example, Tanzania laws requiring foreign investment in certain sectors to be made through joint venture arrangement are, arguably, inconsistent with investment treaty provisions that require Tanzania to grant pre-establishment national treatment to foreign investors. Tanzania laws limiting the ability of foreign investors to own land in Tanzania are also, arguably, inconsistent with investment treaty provisions that require Tanzania to grant national treatment to foreign investors.

3.6 Trends in Drafting: Dispute Settlement
Concerns about the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) have been behind many countries’ hence the decisions to reconsider their approach to investment treaties, Tanzania is not exception to this concerns. Tanzania has continued to sign investment treaties that provide for the ISDS, two key trends have been evident in the country’s treaty practice; one is toward greater transparency in the ISDS proceedings and the inclusion of mechanisms that allow states to retain greater control over the interpretation of investment treaties. New transparency rules for investor–state arbitrations held under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the Canada–Tanzania BIT are two examples of recent trends toward greater transparency in investor–state arbitration. Two of Tanzania’s BITs do contain provisions on the transparency of laws, regulations, procedures and administrative rulings and judicial decisions of general applications as well as international agreements which may affect the investment of investors of other contracting party. The Tanzania- Finland BIT allow making publicly of such documents, subject to the reduction of confidential information.​[83]​ 

Historically, most investment treaties do not require a foreign investor to try to resolve a dispute in the court system of the host state before proceeding to arbitration through the ISDS procedure. In these treaties ISDS is offered to investors as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to litigation in the national courts of the host state. Another alternative is to make foreign investors’ ability to bring disputes to ISDS conditional on the investor first having made a reasonable attempt to resolve the dispute in the national court system.  For example, the Tanzania- Finland, the Tanzania – Italy, the Tanzania – Turkey, Tanzania – Korea and the Tanzania – UK BITs their provisions may accommodate arbitration in the competent courts of the contracting party in whose territory the investment was made.​[84]​  Efforts currently underway to improve the efficiency and reliability of Tanzania’s national court system raise questions about whether investment treaties should require foreign investors to make some attempt to resolve disputes in national courts before submitting claims to ISDS.​[85]​
3.7 Inclusion of Provisions on Responsible Investment and Sustainable Development
A report published by the OECD in 2014 shows the steady increase in the number of investment treaties containing provisions dealing with sustainable development and responsible investment.​[86]​ However, a significant majority of existing BITs signed by Tanzania still contain no mention of either sustainable development or the need for responsible investor conduct. Where investment treaties contain language on sustainable development, it is often found in general statements of the treaty’s general aims contained in the Preamble to the treaty.​[87]​ Such language may provide guidance to an arbitral tribunal interpreting an investment treaty, but does not create substantive rights or obligations. 

Similarly, where investment treaties contain provisions on responsible investor conduct, they are normally phrased in aspiration, non-binding language. For example, Article 4 of Tanzania -Turkey BIT deals with health, safety and environmental measures. It provides that any Party should not waive or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in its territory of an investment of an investor, and if a Party considers that the other Party' has offered such an encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement. In my view such language is non- binding to neither investor nor the Government, and does not create substantive rights or obligations to any contracting party. The SADC’s BIT model is more innovative, in that it places binding obligations on foreign investors not to engage in corrupt practices and to comply with the laws of the host state.​[88]​

3.8 Conclusion
Generally the trend in Tanzania treaty practice indicates that there is a tendency of inclusion of different types of provisions in different treaties and from differences in the drafting of provisions common to several treaties. The reason for such trend being to make sure that Tanzania enters into investment agreements that achieve a balance between protecting the capital exporting investors and defending the regulatory authority of the country.' 

The trend also indicates that there is a minor difference between one BIT and another, this minor differences in wording may significantly alter an investment treaty’s implications in practice. These differences make compliance with existing investment treaties difficult and significantly increase the risk of unexpected and costly future investor state claims.











4.0 THE IMPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT ON TANZANIA’S FOREIGN INVESTMENT RELATED LEGISLATION
4.1 Introduction
The international legal framework for foreign investment protection has been outlined.​[89]​ It has been established that state’s entry into these investment treaties and ratifications of conventions into domestic legislations makes the protection mechanism part of their legal framework. The legal framework gives investors an avenue to seek remedy outside the domestic courts of the host states, against an act of government that have had a negative impact on their investment sometimes without exhaustion of local remedies.

Therefore, the requirements of international investment law can have significant impacts on the implementation of regulatory authorities within a host state. An increasing body of investor-state disputes where the issue of balancing investors’ rights with host countries’ regulatory flexibility has been challenged under trade and investment treaties illustrates this important evolution. The lawfulness of a host state’s regulations is more frequently being challenged by investors. Investor protections contained in investment agreements have the capacity to limit to a large extent their abilities to regulate in the public interest.
Tanzanian government like most other governments has been actively promoting its country as an investment destination. It has increasingly adopted measures to facilitate the entry of FDI. Examples of such measures include liberalising the laws and regulations for the admission and establishment of foreign investment projects; providing guarantees for repatriation of investment and profits; and establishing mechanisms for the settlement of investment disputes. The country also provides the best incentives to investors like tax incentives as part of these promotional efforts. The legal and corporate due diligence evaluation for any particular foreign investment can be a complex exercise, touching on a wide range of laws, regulations and other issues. However, for the matter of this study, assessment and evaluation of the implication of international legal framework for foreign investment on Tanzania’s foreign investment related legislation will dwell on the laws that govern the issues dealing with foreign investment and are more likely to be affected by treaty provisions of the country.

In the light of the above the Tanzania’s regulatory authority by means of taxation law, environmental law, bankrupt law, labour law and property law will be outlined below. And more particular the Tanzania Investment Act will be discussed in detail as it is the main law which deals with investment issues in the country. 

4.2 The Relationship between Investment Treaties and National Laws
Investment treaties are agreements between governments. They apply to all foreign investment between the countries in question that falls within the scope of the treaty. They impose general restrictions on the way in which any government entity including parliament, ministries, regional governments, courts, the military and individual government officials is allowed to treat foreign investors and investments. Foreign investments are also governed by the national laws of the host state. These include laws that are specific to investment such as a host state’s investment law and laws of general application that apply throughout the host state. 

Examples of laws of general application that are relevant to foreign investments include land use laws, employment laws, contract laws, company laws, product liability laws and environmental laws. Investment treaties provide an addition layer of legal protection to foreign investments over and above the investor’s entitlements under the applicable law of the host state and the provisions of any relevant investment contracts. Investment treaties fall within the purview of international law, thus making them hierarchically superior to national laws. As a consequence the provisions of investment treaties prevail over national laws. As such a government may breach an investment treaty even though it complies with its own laws. 

Inconsistency between investment treaties and other legal instruments that govern foreign investments can limit the ability of host states to regulate foreign investment effectively and expose the host state to the risk of legal claims under investment treaties.  These risks are discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections.

4.3 Inconsistency between Provisions under Investments Treaties and National Laws
It is generally agreed as a principle of international law that, as sovereign entities, states are entitled to regulate their national economies independently within their territory.​[90]​ Undeniably, the sovereign right to regulate is one of the main components of the traditional conception of statehood in international law that affects the activities of foreign investors. Investors are subjected to many laws in force in the host state such as the relevant taxation laws as well as regulations related to competition, company laws and employment and environmental protection amongst others.​[91]​ These tensions between domestic law and international investment treaties are particularly evident when looking at the issue of state liability for changes in the general legal framework that impact an existing BIT, investor-state contract or quasi-contractual relationship, such as a permit, license or authorization issued by the government to a private entity. Such impact is likely to constitute a breach of international obligations where a broad definition of fair and equitable treatment is adopted, or where the expropriation of an overseas investment is established, even if it is indirect, creeping​[92]​ or lawful. In the context of this section, the level of respect that arbitration tribunals have paid Tanzania’s regulatory authority will be assessed through five selected domestic laws. This will illustrate the potential conflict between the investment security obligations of the country and its domestic regulatory measures.

4.3.1 Taxation Law
Taxation is, undoubtedly, one of the first elements that potential foreign investor will look at. It is often one of the aspects which can make the host state more competitive than the home country of an investor, and thus conducive to relocation. Hence international investment law shows a strong interest in taxation, for several reasons detailed below. Host states are sovereign with regard to the sectors of the economy in which they allow foreign investors to operate.​[93]​ Tax policy is a matter that clearly falls within the customary regulatory powers of the state. Thus, governments can specify to what extent financial limits (minimum or maximum) may apply on investments and what kind of restrictions, if any, are placed on the import or export of goods or services, allocations of profits, and taxes and other levies to be paid.  Nevertheless, host states are also subjected to certain obligations towards home states to respect the rights of foreign investors established within their territory.​[94]​

Many different ways of treating taxation in modern bilateral and multilateral investment treaties deserve to be closely analysed. International investment agreements make provision for taxation issues only to a limited extent on the admission, treatment and protection of foreign investment. Such provisions are not many in number because large networks of tax treaties such as double taxation treaties exist in parallel.  It appears that if some BITs state that the provisions on National and MFN treatments do not apply to tax matters,​[95]​ others do extend those standards of treatment to legislation relating to taxation. An example of a formulation of the exemption of taxation issues appears in Article 4 of the Netherlands- Tanzania BIT.​[96]​ As a result, National and MFN treatments are granted to investors of the other party by each of the parties in respect of taxes, fees, charges and fiscal deductions and exemptions, except for fiscal advantages accorded by a party “(a) under an agreement for the avoidance of double taxation; (b) by virtue of its participation in a customs union, economic union or similar institution, or (c) on the basis of reciprocity.”

The coverage of taxation matters in investment agreements may also be limited by a general stipulation stressing that only expropriation protection will apply to taxation. Thus, for example, the Canada- Tanzania BIT has a clause stating that expropriation shall apply to taxation measures​[97]​, this means that some taxation measure may amounts to an expropriation. Thus the foreign investor may be entitled to the claim for such taxation measures which amount to expropriation under the treaty. This provision provides a strong protection of investors under the investment treaty at the expense of the discretion of host states in their use of tax measures as an instrument of regulatory power. Such an approach relies on the definition of expropriation provided in the IIA as well as on whether a clear distinction between legitimate taxation measures and measures whose effect is to effectively expropriate the investment is expressly stipulated in the agreement. 
By contrast, other BITs contain a general exception on taxation. The BIT between Republic of Korea and Tanzania is illustrative of one type of general exception that excludes all taxation matters from the scope of application of the agreement. Article 3 (3) reads:

“The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article shall not be construed so as to oblige one Contracting Party to extend to the investors of the other Contracting Party the benefit of any treatment, preference or privilege resulting from any international agreement or arrangement relating wholly or mainly to taxation or any domestic legislation relating wholly or mainly to taxation.”​[98]​ Thus, regardless of the degree of inconsistency with any of the treaty obligations, no taxation laws or regulations could be successfully challenged under the BIT. Dealing with exclusively international taxation issues in separate treaties is considered by many countries as the best way to retain maximum fiscal sovereignty.​[99]​ 

Another interesting example is the reference to taxation measures in the Canadian – Tanzania BIT. This clause attempts to strike a balance between the protections that the BIT and an investment contract may provide to an investor, on the one hand, and the concern of the government authorities to safeguard flexibility to implement their fiscal policies, on the other. Thus, the BIT does not, in principle, apply to taxation measures, unless the competent authorities of each contacting party disagree among themselves that they in fact amount to an expropriation or that such measures violate a contract previously agreed between the investor and the host country.​[100]​ 

Firstly, the National and MFN treatments apply to taxation measures other than certain categories, including taxes on income, capital gains or on the taxable capital of corporations and taxes on estates, subject to exceptions for advantages granted pursuant to double taxation treaties and to country specific reservations. Secondly, an investor may refer the issue of whether or not a measure is an expropriation to international arbitration only if the competent tax authorities have failed to agree on it within a period of six months after the date on which the matter is referred to them.​[101]​ Article also 14(6) (b) requires that questions whether a taxation measure has expropriatory effects, or whether a taxation measure alleged to constitute an expropriation is discriminatory, be submitted in the first instance to the competent tax authorities of the contracting parties concerned and it should be after a period of six months.

Besides, taxation does not amount to a taking. Nevertheless, when a state enforces a tax qualified as unreasonable or discriminatory, an expropriation will be found.​[102]​ The need to define expropriation with respect to tax measures becomes necessary. Such a need also applies to other fundamental substantive provisions of the IIAs. Impliedly the law related to taxation in foreign investment in Tanzania is governed by the Income Tax Act, 1973, The Customer Tariff Act, 1976, The Sales Tax Act, 1976 and any other law for the time being in force.​[103]​ And according to the Income Tax Act Chapter 332 [2008 Revised Edition] if the provisions of the international agreements are inconsistence with that of international agreements the international agreements provision will prevail​[104]​ thus the need to properly draft the taxation provision in the BITs of which Tanzania is a party becomes more important.

4.3.1 Bankruptcy Law
Where a state places a company into liquidation, this can obviously affect the foreign investor, since it results in a loss of control over the asset. According to the treaties, expropriation will be lawful and effective only if it is undertaken for a public purpose, on discriminatory grounds and upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. The trend is for such treaties to also cover “measures having effect equivalent to expropriation or nationalization”.​[105]​ The interpretation accorded thus far opens the expropriation provisions to indirect forms of expropriations, creeping, and regulatory takings by a host country’s actions. Such actions may include regulatory actions that affect the value of an investment or render it economically not viable and hence requiring compensation.

The introduction of unilateral insolvency by the administration or the incitement of this by preliminary requisitioning can thus constitute an expropriation which requires compensation for the investor.​[106]​ For example the Sweden- Tanzania BIT contains a provision that refers to the protection against the abuse of the process of liquidation.​[107]​ Although tribunal’s decision indicates that an order of liquidation incited by the government cannot constitute an expropriation which implies compensation for the investor when foreign companies are already in a failing situation.​[108]​  Such provision may accommodate the government to be held liable for expropriation.  Thus when used it is important to list out in treaties and agreements the permissible regulatory actions regarding procedures of liquidation so that there are no disputes or conflicts arising out of such issues. Looking at the Companies Act of 2002 which deals with bankruptcy, it seems that the Act deals with the foreign company winding up proceedings​[109]​ and that it offers additional protection for companies under difficulties.​[110]​This implies that in most cases foreign company will rely in the BITs provisions when there is an abuse of process in liquidation by governments as the Act is silent on the issue.

4.3.2 Environmental Law
 Environmental protection issue becomes the foreign investors concern during the investment process. On the one hand, it could be said that certain investors seek host countries with lower environmental standards, in order to make more profits than in their country of origin. The investors would seek to establish themselves within a sufficiently healthy environmental framework to be able to attract social capital and, very often, in order to sell their products in their home country. Regardless of the validity of each of these facts, environmental protection, like other national laws, is of interest to international investment law. The concept of environmental protection is broad because it includes concepts of the preservation of the quality of the air, water, and soil; the sustainable use of natural resources; the preservation of human, animal and plant life and health, and of the ecosystem more generally.​[111]​ 

The basis of environmental regulation is therefore based on these key issues. The protection of environment has gradually emerged as a new issue in several BITs. Indeed, some agreements have reiterated the authority of national governments to design and implement measures to safeguard certain values such as the environment. The investor could encounter unforeseeable difficulties in environmental law given the interpretation of a growing number of arbitration tribunals, if the interpretations are standards of general application. Environmental protection applies not only to states but also to private non-state actors such as corporations. It concerns many acts and can affect investors in several ways. The measures designed to protect the environment are applicable from the establishment of the investment, but may be unknown to the investor because of promises of exemption or exemptions previously allocated but subsequently withdrawn. Alternatively, the foreign investor may be unaware of such measures due to lack of clarity, false or contradictory information provided by the legal administration. In another situation, the measures of protection of the environment may be introduced a posteriori and differ from the initial expectations of the investor. 

Therefore, the relationship and the issues that may arise between investment protection and provisions of environmental protection in the IIAs may be illustrated by taking into account some provisions of investment agreements. Host states grant themselves the right to interfere when, for example, multinational corporations cause environmental pollution. The regulatory right of the state might prevent a foreign investor from harmful decisions protecting the environment.​[112]​ The protections that can be the basis for a dispute over environmental regulation under the BITs, MITs or regional agreements like the SADC are generally standards of treatment such as national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment as well as prohibitions of expropriation. A certain number of standards of protection regarding the environment included in the IIAs need to be examined. Four categories can be distinguished:​[113]​ (1) the responsibility of governments or enterprises with regard to environmental protection; (2) the regulatory power of states to take measures for the protection of health and environment; (3) the avoidance of relaxation of environmental standards as a means of attracting FDI; and (4) the promotion, development and transfer of environmentally sound technologies and management practices. 
Thus, such issues which can be found as provisions in free trade agreements or investment treaties might be breached and consequently lead to an arbitration dispute. Therefore, it is of interest to mention several provisions which address environmental concerns. One among the Tanzania’s BITs discourages the lowering of domestic standards as a means of attracting FDI. According to the Canada- Tanzania BIT provide:
“The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures. Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party considers that the other Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement.’’​[114]​


The above provision, not defining the term “environmental measures,” seems to cover any law, regulation or administrative decision regulating environmental matters in the territory of the contracting parties. The clause addresses the waiving or relaxing of “any” environmental measure or offering to do so in order to attract or maintain an investment. Thus, it would be unnecessary to demonstrate a continuous tendency of behavior by a contracting party in violation of the commitment.

In consequence, a number of international investment agreements recognize the right of states to adopt certain measures designed to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.​[115]​ In the light of the above analysis it is submitted that Section 93 of the Environmental Management Act of 2004, which provide the power to the minister of cancelation of license for business which contravene the Act may attract expropriation dispute. Because arbitral tribunals have stated that one core obligation in investment treaties the fair and equitable treatment (FET) obligation protects the “legitimate expectations” of investors made at the time of the investment;​[116]​ and if the legal framework governing the investment changes in a way that was not anticipated or foreseen by the investor at the time of making the investment, then the investor should be compensated for the cost of complying with those changes.​[117]​ This means that if a new law is adopted, or an existing law is revoked or interpreted or applied in a new way,​[118]​ those changes can trigger state liability.

In contrast the draft article of an agreement between the EU and the Pacific members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACPGS) countries of June 2006 takes a step forward in narrowing the scope of regulatory measures as non compensable expropriations:​[119]​ Consistent with the right of states to regulate and the customary international law principles on police powers, bona fide, non-discriminatory regulatory measures taken by a party that are designed and applied to protect or enhance legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute an expropriation under this Article. 

If this draft article remains in the adoption of the final agreement, it would constitute an important new trend in foreign investment law and would possibly be more protective in acknowledging the exercise of the regulatory powers of host states.


4.3.3 Labour Law  
The labour law of the host state is also of great practical interest. Foreign investors often have activities with a strong labour component in the host state, generally because the production costs tend to be lower than in their home state. Accordingly, the legal system applicable to the employees would be of interest to the investors. It is thus possible that international investment law is invoked against measures taken by the host state regarding the labour laws. This is true especially for the standards relating to minimum wage, working hours or social contributions. However, the host state is unlikely to be sanctioned for measures in this field if the increased costs are unforeseen to the investor, as it is a normal investment risk. More particularly, such a measure would be by nature non-discriminatory and thus in conformity with the principle of the national treatment as well with the most-favoured nation treatment. Employment and labour provisions are relatively uncommon in Tanzania’s IIAs. 

Labour concerns may be incorporated in the BIT preambles through a political statement. For example, the Finland - Tanzania BIT states:
The Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, hereinafter referred to as the “Contracting Parties”, ... agreeing that a stable framework for investment will contribute to maximising the effective utilisation of economic resources and improve living standards; recognising that the development of economic and business ties can promote respect for internationally recognised labour rights; …​[120]​

Arguably, the parties’ policy space in relation to the improvement of labor standards is nonetheless safeguarded through the preambular paragraph expressing the desire to achieve the treaty objectives “in a manner consistent with … the promotion of internationally recognized labor rights.” Some provisions may be impliedly interpreted that they also recognize international law standards of labour though they not directly state about labour. For example the Tanzania- Republic of Korea BIT states:

“Where a matter is governed simultaneously both by this Agreement and by any other international agreement to which both Contracting Parties are parties, or by general principles of international law, nothing in this Agreement shall prevent either Contracting Party or any of its investors from taking advantage of whichever rules are the more favourable to his case.”​[121]​

 This may accommodate the interpretation that they refers to the obligations of each party derived from their membership of the ILO and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. But it lacks a clear obligation to adopt and maintain the ILO standards as a minimum, and does not allow disputes to be submitted to arbitration.The Canada- Tanzania BIT also stress that the contracting parties must explicitly strive to abstain from relaxing labour standards as a means of attracting or maintaining investment in their territories. It states: 

“The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures. Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party considers that the other Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement”.​[122]​

Though limited to health, safety and environmental measures, the approach of this provision can be adapted to employment issues in general, as well as to other emerging issues. It is submitted that unlike other treaty’s substantive obligation, such as those guarantee against expropriation without compensation; this provision lack effective enforcement mechanism i.e. it is not subjected to the agreement dispute provisions. The treaty simply requires that the signatory states consult with each other regarding any issues that may arise under this provision. But, while offering little in the way of formal redress for transgression of this provision through the imposition of environmental or labour oriented investment incentives, this is an intriguing recognition of the impact that investment incentives may have on general public and how the concern may often fail to be appreciated by either investors or governments during the negotiation of investment packages.

It has been said that the threat of arbitration was likely to make host states hesitant to implement measures in the pursuit of social policy objectives, such as the improvement of labor standards, out of fear that by doing so it might violate the standards of treatment prescribed by an investment agreement. On this account, the IIAs potentially even lead to a 'regulatory chill'.​[123]​ The more so, since foreign investors have already demonstrated their readiness to use the IIAs as a way to challenge undesirable legislative and administrative measures adopted by host states in pursuance of public policy objectives, such as those aimed at the promotion of public health or the protection of the environment.​[124]​ 

In light of these precedents, it is submitted that a fear that investors might bring similar claims in response to the introduction or significant increase of a minimum wage, introduction or strengthening of collective bargaining rights, constraints on the use of casual labor, or the failure to end industrial disputes or strikes has the effect of affecting regulatory authority for labour legislation to the country.

4.3.4 Property Law 
The taking of private assets by public authorities raises significant issues of international law, where such takings involve the assets of foreign investors. This section examines the concept of expropriation in the context of international law and IIAs. The focus of the analysis is on the different categories of takings, addressing in particular the problem of the distinction between governmental measures that involve interference with the assets of foreign investors, yet do not require compensation, and those that do require compensation. 

The BITs and other international instruments for the protection of foreign investment virtually always contain provisions prohibiting the taking of assets of foreign investors by public authorities. Nevertheless, such takings are considered to be lawful if they respect four requirements namely, if done for a public purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis, with payment of compensation, and, in many cases, with due process of law. There has often been a debate between the definition of the terms “expropriation” taking the property of an individual firm and “nationalisation” taking property in an industry or economy-wide context.​[125]​ The argument further advanced that expropriation is subjected to a different standard of compensation than nationalisation. The IIAs traditionally do not make such a difference and a single set of rules pertain to both expropriation and nationalisation. For example Article 5(1) of the Denmark- Tanzania BIT states;
“Investments of Investors of each Contracting Party shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to a measure or measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as ‘Expropriation’) except where such Expropriation is…”

It is traditionally acknowledged that the notion of expropriation is not restricted to scenarios where there is a official transfer of title to a property but can also include certain forms of interference by a state with property rights. The IIAs reflect the concept that expropriation and nationalisation can take place in many forms which include notions such as “indirect” expropriation or action that is “tantamount” to expropriation. For example, Article 6 (1) of the Tanzania – Turkey BIT states;

“Investments shall not be expropriated, nationalized or subject, directly or indirectly, to measures of similar effects (hereinafter referred as expropriation) except…”

It has been suggested that a “direct” expropriation is characterised by acts that transfer title and physical possession, whereas “indirect” expropriation involves acts that effectuate the loss of management, use or control, or a significant depreciation in the value, of assets.​[126]​ 
The Canada –Tanzania BIT​[127]​ provide that an establishment of whether an act or series of acts comprise indirect expropriation necessitates a case-by case inquiry. This would be done based on judging the economic impact of the measure, the extent to which the government action infringes reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. In addition, it is specified that non discriminatory regulatory actions are applied only in special circumstances where legitimate public welfare objectives are involved.
 
The broad scope of the notion of expropriation used in the IIAs (arising from the references to indirect expropriation and processes with similar effects) has raised the question of whether compensable expropriation of foreign investment would be the result of a state exercising its regulatory powers in matters of trade, taxation, and public health. As a result, in addition to the concepts of direct and indirect expropriation, the literature often employs the concept of "regulatory takings". One suggested definition is that regulatory takings "are those takings of property that fall within the police powers of a state, or otherwise arise from measures like those pertaining to the regulation of the environment, health, morals, culture or economy of a host country."​[128]​ Nevertheless the IIAs do not unequivocally use the phrase “regulatory takings”; such takings are included under the broad scope of indirect expropriation. 

The concept of indirect expropriation and non-compensable regulatory governmental measures as two distinct notions has not been systematically articulated.​[129]​ Nevertheless, tribunals when providing their findings in many awards have found various criteria in order to distinguish these concepts:​[130]​ “i) the degree of interference with the property right; ii) the character of governmental measures (ex: the purpose and the context of the measure); iii) the interference of the measure with reasonable and investment-backed expectations.” In addition to the criteria determined via the jurisprudence whether an indirect expropriation has occurred, the Tanzania’s treaty practice is also significant in relation to this issue. Accordingly, the Canada- Tanzania BIT establishes explicitly a list of what represents an indirect expropriation:
“The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation requires a case-by case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors:
(a) 	the economic impact of the measure or series of measures, although the sole fact that a measure or series of measures of a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment shall not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred;
· (b) the extent to which the measure or series of measures interfere with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and
· (c) the character of the measure or series of measures.​[131]​
Furthermore, the BIT addresses the borderline between indirect expropriation and the right to regulate it provides that;

“Except in rare circumstances, non discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to achieve legitimate public welfare objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations”.​[132]​

These criteria are consistent with those emerging from arbitral decisions. Such a detailed list of criteria provides a significant assistance when determining whether an indirect expropriation requiring compensation has occurred. As seen above depending on the definition of expropriation, the scope of these clauses can be very broad and include a substantial amount of regulatory measures taken by the host state that could affect the investment or property of a foreign investor. With the objective of adequately and fully protecting of the investor from expropriation, the IIAs with a wide international legal requirement of compensation have the side effect of reducing legitimate national regulatory activity​[133]​, due to the host state’s fear of having to pay compensation arising from the violation of the expropriation clause. This is especially relevant when dealing with possible cases of indirect expropriation, since the host state regulation will either be accepted as an act falling under the sovereign competences of the state and not result in compensation​[134]​ or will amount to indirect expropriation and consequently the foreign investor will receive compensation.​[135]​ Although it is widely accepted that host states have the right to enact legitimate regulatory acts that affect foreign investors, the understanding regarding which regulations do not result in compensation differs substantially. Therefore, to avoid legal uncertainty, the drafting parties should avoid over inclusiveness and under inclusiveness of the expropriation clause in order to strike the appropriate balance between the protection of the foreign investors and the host state regulatory activity. 

4.4 The Implications of International Legal Framework for Foreign Investment on Tanzania Investment Act
4.4.1 Introduction
The Tanzania Investment Act, Act No 26 of 1997 is the main law relating to investment issues in Tanzania. It is an Act to make provisions for investments in Tanzania, to provide for more favorable conditions for investors, and for related matters.​[136]​ It provides for the establishment of enterprises; investment incentives and guarantees; transfer of capital profits; guarantees against expropriation; dispute settlement; and employment of foreign staff. The Act also establishes the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) as a “one-stop” office for investors.

This implies that the Act has direct implications on establishment, encouragement and enjoyment of foreign investment in the country. Because when it comes to the issue of  determining the rights and duties of either a foreign investor or a host country both the international law or host state law is applicable,​[137]​it is submitted that the Act could be of the most assistance in interpretation of some parts of treaty provisions as herein below discussed.
4.4.2 Investment Protection
The Tanzanian Government is aware of the long-term adverse effects of government expropriation or seizure of private sector corporate assets, and has specifically addressed this issue in the 1997 Act. The Tanzania Investment Act provides specific protection to foreign investments. Section 22 of the Act provides for the protection of foreign investments. The provision reads: 

“22 (a) No business shall be nationalised or expropriated by the government.
The provision further provides that in case of expropriation conducted under due process of law, payment of fair, adequate and prompt compensation shall be made.”​[138]​The provision looks clear and unambiguous but is subject to criticism as the international framework protections of foreign investors provide for indirect expropriation; failure to address the issue of indirect expropriation in my view will lead for foreign investors to resort to those provisions in the BITs which most of them allow indirect expropriation. One would expected that it could provide a detailed explanation on indirect or creeping expropriation that an investor whose claim is based on creeping or indirect expropriation would have to establish that the acts complained of amounted to tantamount expropriation or have expropriatory effect which would have placed the  burden of proof to investor.

The Act has given foreign investors various rights but it is silent on duties on the part of investors. The Act fails short of incorporating corporate social responsibility clause. This is an area which needs amendment. This will enable foreign investors to have certain duties and responsibility to the local community. This need to be made compliance for foreign invested enterprises in Tanzania. The corporate social responsibility clause would encourage foreign companies to play a role in engaging with stakeholders and contribute to the economic, social and environmental development in the country.
4.4.3 Investment Restriction and Requirement
The Act does not set performance requirements or any other quantitative or qualitative investment goals for investment projects in either a formal or an indicative sense. There is an expectation that the job creation, investment expenditure and business growth targets provided by investors in the business feasibility plans attached to their business registration application will be actively pursued.
4.4.4 Treatment of Investment
A policy priority in Tanzania is to treat foreign investors on a par with domestic investors. The provisions of the Act apply to both foreign and local investors without distinction, with the important qualification that the benefits and protection to be afforded by the Act to a foreign investor require a minimum capital investment of $300,000 (Tshs 660,000,000/=) but are extended to a local investor on a capital investment of $100,000 (Tshs 220,000,000/=).​[139]​
Local investors are granted certain benefits on a par with foreign investors even in cases where it is common to grant such benefits only to foreign investors. These include the fiscal stability clause contained in Section 19(2), which provides that benefits accorded to a holder of the Certificate under applicable fiscal legislation will not “be amended or modified to the detriment of the investors enjoying those benefits.” Other examples include repatriation of funds and employment of expatriates. Section 21 guarantees to all certificate holders the right to make transfer payments in freely convertible currency. Such payments include transfers to service loans in foreign currencies, transfers of dividends or profits and proceeds of sale or liquidation. The Act however does not make provisions for further standards of protection as discussed earlier​[140]​ such as Free and Equitable Treatment, Most Favoured Nation status, national treatment, discriminatory and arbitrary measures, and full protection and security this may accommodate the foreign investor to rely mostly in BITs for applications of such standards.

4.4.5 Settlement of Investment Dispute
The Act contains provisions for the negotiation and settlement of disputes among Tanzanian and foreign enterprises, the TIC and central government, but it does not shed light on how disputes with local communities will be dealt with.  Where the preferred amicable settlement via negotiation between the parties is not achieved, the parties may then seek agreement through the arbitration laws of Tanzania, through the ICSID, or within appropriate bilateral or multilateral treaties.​[141]​ 

The provision of the resolving dispute within the appropriate bilateral or multilateral treaties gives foreign investors the opportunity to use international arbitration laws and tribunal rather than arbitration laws of the country and courts. Investors are typically concerned about the time it takes for disputes to be settled in national courts. Delays in dispute settlement can have major implications for returns on investments. Also, investors may be concerned that courts in the host country may not be impartial or effective. The Tanzania Investment Act also does not provide for specific mechanisms for the determination of investment disputes between local communities and investors. Those disputes would need to be determined by national courts on the basis of applicable national law. Those disputes relating to land can be taken to the dispute settlement mechanism that was established by the land laws of 1999, namely the Land Act and the Village Land Act.  Not only that but also more importantly, there appears to be no defined statutory mechanism through which investors can ensure that progress is made in addressing concerns and disputes of investors that are less serious than full disputes. The Act also does not include a 'fork-in-the-road' provision which generally limits an investor to selecting only one out of a number of agreed dispute resolution forums. For example, if an investor submits its dispute to the local courts, then a fork-in-the-road provision would prevent the investor from also pursuing other dispute resolution procedures under the BIT, such as international arbitration. In the absence of a fork-in-the-road provision, submission of a dispute to local courts will not preclude the investor from pursuing other dispute resolution options. Consequently, a foreign investor is at liberty to institute arbitration proceedings against a government in Tanzania even after bringing a claim or counterclaim against the government in a court or domestic arbitration.

The issue of consent to arbitration is also provided in the Act. Section 23(2) of the Tanzanian Investment Act of 1997 provides in relevant part:

"A dispute between a foreign investor and the [Tanzania Investment] Centre or the Government in respect of a business enterprise which is nit settled through negotiations may be submitted to arbitration in accordance with any of the following methods as may be mutually agreed by the parties, [...]"







5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATIONS
5.1 Conclusions
This study set out to situate the investment treaty practice of Tanzania and examine whether the country treaty practice conforms or differs from general investment treaty practices. Through reviewing the treaty practice of the country, the study also sought to explore the extent to which the emerging investment treaty practice interferes or restrains regulatory authority of the country. In so doing, the study raises awareness to Tanzania specific concerns with respect to the international law of foreign investment; the controversy entrenched in substantive treaty standards and the suitability of treaties concluded by the country.

Chapters 2, 3 and 4 show that Tanzania treaty standards are similar to general treaty provisions elsewhere. In essence, BITs of which Tanzania is a party do not offer any nuance and generally follow existing BITs. It can be concluded here that Tanzania has the requisite legal framework for protection of foreign investment under its national and international instruments the same as international legal framework for protection of foreign investment.
The analysis also demonstrates that there really are not many differences between the BITs concluded by Tanzania and other existing BITs. Similarly, the majority of the BITs concluded by the country have more similarities than differences. In essence, some Tanzania’s BITs contain slight variations. This variation results from the inclusion of different types of provisions in different treaties and from differences in the drafting of provisions common to several treaties. It is submitted that this minor differences in wording can significantly alter an investment treaty’s implications in practice, and that such differences make compliance with existing investment treaties difficult and significantly increase the risk of unexpected and costly future investor–state claims.

As the analysis illustrate, some BITs have expropriation provisions that do not explicitly capture indirect expropriation but contain phrases such as measures equivalent to expropriation which are functionally equivalent to indirect expropriation. Perhaps, more striking is the fact that majority of Tanzania expropriation clauses are generic and do not delimit the contours of indirect expropriation. The resulting consequences for the country is that predominantly arbitral tribunals apply the sole effect test which has the propensity to constrain the country from pursuing regulatory measures even in the public interest.

The country treaty practice also indicates that most of the treaties focus exclusively on foreign investor rights and protection. One can only but notice that except for the BIT between Canada and Tanzania, which is more sophisticated and try to strike a better balance between the different private and public interests at stake, in other BITs there is no frequent space for provision of the right of the country to take regulatory measures in order to achieve the objective of making laws for public interest. 

5.2 Recommendations
On the basis of the existing investment regime, Tanzania can pursue a number of policy options which include, withdrawing from BITs, renegotiate existing BITs, refusing to consent to foreign model drafts, and prepare more favourable model drafts. However, for Tanzania to successfully pursue any of these practical policy options this would require. Although withdrawing from BITs and renegotiating existing BITs are attractive policy options, this is not without high risks. Essentially, this can create the perception that the country is renouncing its BIT treaty commitments which in turn may discourage reluctant foreign investors from investing in the country. 
Given the high risks, the most plausible option would be for Tanzania to prepare its own model text which in turn would enable the country avoid the practice of simply consenting to foreign model drafts. In essence, through this approach the country would be using legal tools to advance more balanced treaty provisions that do not expansively constrain the ability of the country to implement regulatory measures. There are many model texts the country can borrow from when drafting or negotiating future treaty provisions that balance the interests of foreign investors and government regulatory competence. With respect to existing models, the SADC BIT Model is an ideal starting point because it addresses many of the ambiguities existing in majority of BITs.

For purposes of clarity, the Tanzania BIT model should draw a distinction between direct and indirect expropriation. For purposes of regulatory autonomy, the country BIT model should stress that legally implemented regulatory measures aimed at serving legitimate public objectives such the environment, public health, safety do not constitute indirect expropriation. Even more, for purposes of guiding the discretion of arbitral tribunals, the model text should provide approaches arbitral tribunals can use when examining allegations of indirect expropriation. To this end, the country model text should follow the wording of the Canada Tanzania BIT. It reads as follows;

“The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation requires a case-by case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors:
(a) 	the economic impact of the measure or series of measures, although the sole fact that a measure or series of measures of a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment shall not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred;
· (b) 	the extent to which the measure or series of measures interfere with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and
· (c) 	the character of the measure or series of measures”​[143]​

By including the above provisions the Tanzania model text would ensure that not all government regulatory measures amount to indirect expropriation. Also, the suggested provisions require arbitral tribunals to consider the character of government measures and, more importantly, economic considerations do not outweigh the purpose of government measures. Obviously, arbitral tribunals must make a value judgment but such an analysis cannot entirely be influenced by economic considerations but rather a thorough consideration of the government regulatory measures vis-à-vis the extent to which such measures interfere with duly acquired property rights. 

Similarly, as noted in Chapter 3, the standard of fair and equitable treatments in majority of Tanzania BITs is autonomous and not linked to the minimum standard. Given the expansive wording of the standard, arbitral tribunals have the discretion to interpret the meaning of fair and equitable treatment broadly. Obviously, although the content of the minimum standard remains controversial but for the purposes of avoiding an overly expansive interpretation of fair and equitable treatment, the model Tanzania text should stipulate that fair and equitable treatment is no more than the minimum standard. This would minimise the possibility of arbitral tribunals second guessing the intention of the contracting parties. For further clarity and to guide arbitral tribunals, the model Tanzania text should stipulate that fair and equitable treatment is functionally equivalent to the minimum standard and not an independent treaty standard. The benefit of this approach ensures that arbitral tribunals do not impose an idiosyncratic standard of what is fair or equitable without reference to established sources of law.​[144]​  According to Mondev International v United States of America, the phase ‘‘minimum standard of treatment has historically been understood as reference to a minimum standard under customary international law, whatever controversies there may have been over the content of that standard.”​[145]​


Since there is no Tanzania BIT model and it may take long time to make it, it is recommended that when negotiating new IIAs or revising their current ones, Tanzania need to legitimately consider new concerns such as environment and social issues. One way of doing so is for the country to clarify uncertain legal terms where interpretation provided by tribunals might be inconsistent such as ‘foreign investor’, ‘fair and equitable treatment’ or ‘indirect expropriation.’ When negotiated with care and caution the BITs can deliver the promised benefits of foreign direct investment and economic growth, but for that it is crucially important for the policy makers and negotiators of the BITs to be well informed of the implications of the obligations that they are entering into. It is hoped that the trend towards fostering and developing an understanding of these terms will continue and secure the best possible deal for its adherents in future negotiations.
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